Greenwich Club Residences (88 Greenwich Street)

Greenwich Club Residences (88 Greenwich Street) is a Yield-Oriented (At Risk) asset that functions as a high-velocity rental factory but serves as a "value trap" for capital. While the building offers entry-level pricing ($900–$1,100 PPSF) and consistent rental demand, post-sponsor analysis reveals that long-term owners frequently exit at nominal losses or flat returns. Recent 2025 resales are clearing at prices roughly equivalent to 2007 sponsor levels, representing a massive real-value loss against the NYXRCSA benchmark. Income capture is viable for cash-flow investors, but equity preservation is severely compromised by sponsor price normalization and unit mix imbalance.
Tony InJe Yeo's avatar
Feb 24, 2026
Greenwich Club Residences (88 Greenwich Street)

1. BUILDING OVERVIEW (ANALYST FRAMING)

Greenwich Club Residences (88 Greenwich Street) is a large-scale postwar resale condo (converted 2007) in the Financial District, comprising 458 units across 37 floors. Based on post-sponsor behavior, the building is classified as Yield-Oriented (At Risk). While it functions as a high-volume rental engine with 641 recorded rental transactions, the asset suffers from severe capital stagnation and volatility. Urbandigs data indicates it underperforms the Financial District sub-market by 5.2%. Longitudinal analysis reveals that units held for 15+ years are frequently trading at nominal losses or zero growth, drastically diverging from the NYXRCSA benchmark, which reached 331.14 in October 2025.


2. UNIT MIX & COMPOSITION

Based on 852 recorded sales, the inventory is overwhelmingly skewed toward small, transient footprints, creating a highly commoditized resale environment.

  • Studio: ~332 sales (~39% of activity). Median PPSF: $1,037.

  • 1BR: ~319 sales (~37% of activity). Median PPSF: $1,185-$1,226.

  • 2BR: ~55 sales (~6% of activity). Median PPSF: $1,162.

  • 3BR+: ~6 sales (<1% of activity). Median PPSF: $1,240.

Analysis: The building has a severe unit mix imbalance. The high density of Studios and 1BRs (nearly 80% of sales volume) creates intense internal competition. This mix supports rental velocity but caps resale appreciation, as buyers have ample inventory to choose from, preventing price scarcity.


3. LINE (STACK) PERFORMANCE — RESALE ONLY

  • Liquidity (Resale Only): Resale liquidity is volatile. While some units clear quickly (e.g., Unit 512 in 26 days), the "tail" of inventory often lingers.

    • Unit 819 (Studio): 290 Days on Market (Sold Jul 2025).

    • Unit 708 (1BR): 212 Days on Market (Sold May 2025).

    • Unit 3505 (1BR): 127 Days on Market (Sold Aug 2025).

    • Conclusion: A median resale DOM of 98 days suggests moderate friction, but outlier units can sit for nearly a year.

  • Price Strength:

    • Pricing power has eroded. Recent 2025 trades show Studios clearing near $1,000 PPSF (e.g., Unit 602 at $1,006 PPSF), which is below the building's historical median of $1,095.

    • Line 05 (1BR) shows weakness: Unit 3505 sold for $810,000 ($1,189 PPSF) in 2025, down from previous highs.

  • Appreciation:

    • Compounding is negative to flat.

    • Unit 2005 (Studio): Sold for $585,493 in Jan 2008 (Sponsor) and resold for $575,000 in Feb 2025. -1.8% Nominal Loss over 17 years.

    • This flat performance contrasts sharply with the NYXRCSA index, which has grown significantly since 2008.


4. BUILDING-WIDE PPSF TREND (NORMALIZED)

  • 2007–2008 (Sponsor Phase): Pricing established at $1,100–$1,300 PPSF (e.g., Unit 2001 at $1,167 PPSF).

  • 2014–2016 (Cyclical Peak): Resale pricing peaked, with trades reaching $1,400–$1,600 PPSF (e.g., Unit 3105 at $1,681 PPSF in 2015).

  • 2024–2025 (Mean-Reversion): Pricing has reverted to $900–$1,100 PPSF.

    • Example: Unit 1008 sold for $1,092 PPSF in Dec 2025.

  • Conclusion: Cyclical / Mean-Reverting. The building has round-tripped to pre-2008 pricing levels.


5. RENT CAPTURE ANALYSIS

  • Mandatory Metric: Effective Annual Rent (EAR)

    • Unit 802 (1BR, 2025): Achieved $4,395. DOM: 168.

      • EAR: $4,395 × (197/365) = $2,372. (~46% Income Leakage).

    • Unit 728 (Studio, 2025): Achieved $3,300. DOM: 61.

      • EAR: $3,300 × (304/365) = $2,748. (~17% Leakage).

    • Unit 3301 (1BR, 2024): Achieved $4,950. DOM: 53.

      • EAR: $4,950 × (312/365) = $4,231.

    • Unit 522 (Studio, 2025): Achieved $4,000. DOM: 13.

      • EAR: $4,000 × (352/365) = $3,857.

    Analysis: The building functions as a high-volume rental engine with strong nominal rents ($70–$80 PPSF). However, units that are aggressively priced suffer from severe income leakage, as seen in Unit 802, which lost nearly half its annual yield to vacancy.


6. B³ SCORING SYSTEM (0–100)

  • Liquidity Score: 55

    • Moderate volume, but median resale DOM of 98 days indicates friction. Significant tail of units sitting 200+ days.

  • Rent Capture Score: 72

    • Strong nominal yields ($70+ PPSF) and high volume (641 rented). Penalized for leakage events where DOM exceeds 60-90 days.

  • Appreciation Score: 20

    • Critical Failure. Long-term holds (15+ years) frequently show flat or negative nominal returns, massively underperforming the NYXRCSA benchmark.


7. COMPOSITE SCORE & CLASSIFICATION

  • Composite Score: 47.85

    • Calculation: $(55 \times 0.35) + (72 \times 0.30) + (20 \times 0.35) = 19.25 + 21.6 + 7 = 47.85$.

  • Category: Yield-Oriented (At Risk)

    • Justification: The building meets the "Yield" criteria via rental velocity. However, the consistent destruction of resale capital (Appreciation Score 20) places it firmly in the "At Risk" category.


8. TRANSACTION EXAMPLES

Resale Depreciation (Capital Erosion)

  1. Unit 1015 (1BR):

    • Bought: $768,778 ($1,098 PPSF) in Dec 2007 (Sponsor).

    • Sold: $525,000 ($750 PPSF) in Aug 2024.

    • Result: -31.7% Nominal Loss over 17 years.

    • Driver: Sponsor price normalization.

  2. Unit 3505 (1BR):

    • Bought: $995,000 ($1,461 PPSF) in Jan 2019.

    • Sold: $810,000 ($1,189 PPSF) in Aug 2025.

    • Result: -18.6% Loss over 6 years.

    • Driver: Market regime timing.

  3. Unit 2005 (Studio):

    • Bought: $727,500 ($1,385 PPSF) in Apr 2016.

    • Sold: $575,000 ($1,150 PPSF) in Feb 2025.

    • Result: -20.9% Loss over 9 years.

    • Driver: Liquidity shift (DOM change).

  4. Unit 1008 (1BR):

    • Bought: $773,870 ($994 PPSF) in Dec 2007 (Sponsor).

    • Sold: $850,000 ($1,092 PPSF) in Dec 2025.

    • Result: +9.8% Gain over 18 years (CAGR 0.5%).

    • Note: Nominal gain, but Real Loss adjusted for inflation/benchmark.

    • Driver: Sponsor price normalization.

Resale Appreciation (Market Timing Exceptions)

  1. Unit 3105 (1BR):

    • Bought: $855,330 ($1,250 PPSF) in May 2008.

    • Sold: $1,150,000 ($1,681 PPSF) in Aug 2015.

    • Result: +34% Gain.

    • Driver: Market regime timing (Sold at 2015 Peak).

  2. Unit 1905 (Studio):

    • Bought: $565,000 ($947 PPSF) in Oct 2009.

    • Sold: $718,000 ($1,204 PPSF) in Jan 2024.

    • Result: +27% Gain.

    • Driver: Market regime timing (Bought at 2009 low).

  3. Unit 2008 (Studio):

    • Bought: $813,581 ($981 PPSF) in Jan 2008.

    • Sold: $995,000 ($1,200 PPSF) in Jul 2022.

    • Result: +22% Gain over 14 years (CAGR ~1.4%).

    • Driver: Line-level premium persistence.

  4. Unit 2605 (1BR):

    • Bought: $855,330 ($1,255 PPSF) in Oct 2007.

    • Sold: $965,000 ($1,417 PPSF) in May 2018.

    • Result: +12.8% Gain over 11 years (CAGR ~1.1%).

Driver: Line-level premium persistence.


9. RISKS & RED FLAGS

  • Capital Destruction: Investing for appreciation is a high-risk strategy here. Units bought in 2007 or 2015-2019 are currently selling at nominal losses (e.g., Unit 1015, -31% loss).

  • Liquidity Traps: High DOMs (e.g., 290 days for Unit 819) indicate that selling requires patience or deep discounting.

  • Red Flag: Do not buy generic lower-floor Studios/1BRs expecting growth; the unit mix imbalance creates a ceiling on price appreciation due to massive internal competition.


10. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Greenwich Club Residences (88 Greenwich Street) is a Yield-Oriented (At Risk) asset that functions as a high-velocity rental factory but serves as a "value trap" for capital. While the building offers entry-level pricing ($900–$1,100 PPSF) and consistent rental demand, post-sponsor analysis reveals that long-term owners frequently exit at nominal losses or flat returns. Recent 2025 resales are clearing at prices roughly equivalent to 2007 sponsor levels, representing a massive real-value loss against the NYXRCSA benchmark. Income capture is viable for cash-flow investors, but equity preservation is severely compromised by sponsor price normalization and unit mix imbalance.


B³ SCORECARD

  • Liquidity Score: 55

  • Rent Capture Score: 72

  • Appreciation Score: 20

  • Composite Score: 47.85

  • Category: Yield-Oriented (At Risk)

  • Unit Mix: Studio/1BR Dominant (~76% of sales)

Disclosures: Approximately 80+ transactions from 2007–2008 (e.g., Units 1015, 2005, 1008) marked as "No Listing" or with DOM $\le$ 30 days were reclassified as Sponsor-Driven per the B³ Protocol. These transactions established the high initial pricing baseline against which current resales show depreciation.

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