Trump World Tower (845 United Nations Plaza)

Trump World Tower is a Yield-Oriented (At Risk) asset that currently functions as a stagnant store of value rather than a growth vehicle. While the building commands consistent rental demand, capital appreciation has been virtually non-existent for nearly two decades, with key lines (like 3BRs) trading in 2022–2025 at prices identical to their 2006 sponsor levels. This represents a massive real-value loss against the NYXRCSA benchmark. Income capture is viable in smaller units, but larger inventory suffers from significant income leakage due to absorption times often exceeding 6 months. Opportunity exists only for yield-focused buyers entering at a distressed basis ($1,200 PPSF).
Tony InJe Yeo's avatar
Feb 24, 2026
Trump World Tower (845 United Nations Plaza)

1. BUILDING OVERVIEW (ANALYST FRAMING)

Trump World Tower (845 United Nations Plaza) is a mature postwar resale condo completed in 2001, comprising 376 units across 72 floors. Based on post-sponsor behavior, the building is classified as Yield-Oriented (At Risk). While the building historically commanded a premium, current resale data indicates severe capital stagnation. Long-term analysis reveals that many lines are trading flat or at a loss compared to their 2006–2015 valuations, drastically underperforming the NYXRCSA index, which grew to 331.14 by late 2025. The asset functions as a high-friction rental engine where liquidity is currently constrained, with median days on market (DOM) significantly higher than the local average.


2. UNIT MIX & COMPOSITION

Based on the provided sales history, the active resale inventory is weighted toward larger 2BR and 3BR units, which contributes to the building's liquidity friction.

  • 2BR: Dominant category (~45% of recent activity). Median PPSF: ~$1,300–$1,500.

  • 3BR: Significant volume (~30% of activity). Median PPSF: ~$1,400–$1,600.

  • 1BR: Moderate volume. Median PPSF: ~$1,180–$1,210.

  • Studios: Niche volume. Median PPSF: ~$1,125.

Analysis: The heavy concentration of large 2BR/3BR units (approx. 75% of sales volume) exposes the building to liquidity shifts. Unlike commoditized 1BRs which turn over quickly, these larger units often require absorption periods exceeding 140 days, creating a "heavy" exit profile for owners.


3. LINE (STACK) PERFORMANCE — RESALE ONLY

  • Liquidity (Fastest Lines): Smaller units demonstrate better velocity. Unit 9H (2BR, 1334 sqft) cleared in 26 days in late 2024.

  • Liquidity (Slowest Lines): Larger footprints face extreme friction. Unit 32D (2BR) lingered for 742 days before selling in May 2024. Unit 20E took 403 days to clear in 2024.

  • Price Strength: Line B (3BR) and Line A (3BR) historically commanded premiums, but recent trades show weakness. Unit 55C (2BR) recently cleared at $1,341 PPSF, while the building median for 2BRs hovers around $1,369.

  • Appreciation: Compounding is virtually non-existent for most lines.

    • Example: Line B (3BR) units like Unit 43B sold for $3.85M in 2022, virtually unchanged from similar line sales in 2006 ($3.86M). This represents 0% nominal growth over 16 years.


4. BUILDING-WIDE PPSF TREND (NORMALIZED)

  • 2006–2014 (Peak Premium): Resale pricing frequently exceeded $1,600–$2,000 PPSF. (e.g., Unit 44B sold for $2,183 PPSF in 2016).

  • 2016–2020 (Correction): Pricing softened, failing to hold the $1,800+ floor.

  • 2023–2025 (Stagnation/Drawdown): Recent trades cluster between $1,200 and $1,500 PPSF.

    • Observation: Unit 60E sold for $1,556 PPSF in 2025, down from comparable highs.

    • Conclusion: Cyclical / Mean-Reverting. The building has failed to capture the post-COVID market appreciation seen in the NYXRCSA index.


5. RENT CAPTURE ANALYSIS

  • Mandatory Metric: Effective Annual Rent (EAR)

    • Unit 22D (2BR, 2025): Achieved $9,500. DOM: 26. EAR: $8,823.

      • Calculation: $9,500 × (339/365). Good capture.

    • Unit 78C (3BR, 2025): Achieved $24,000. DOM: 138. EAR: $14,926.

      • Calculation: $24,000 × (227/365). ~38% Income Leakage due to vacancy.

    • Unit 50A (2BR, 2025): Achieved $12,750. DOM: 314. EAR: $1,781.

      • Calculation: $12,750 × (51/365). Catastrophic Leakage. Ideally, this unit sat empty for nearly a year to achieve this rent.

    Analysis: While nominal rents are strong ($70–$100 PPSF), larger units suffer from massive income leakage. Owners holding out for premium rents (e.g., Unit 50A) often destroy their annual yield through extended vacancy periods (300+ days).


6. B³ SCORING SYSTEM (0–100)

  • Liquidity Score: 50 (Weak. Building-wide median resale DOM is 157 days. While some units move fast, the "tail" of inventory sitting for 200+ days is significant).

  • Rent Capture Score: 65 (Strong nominal PPSF is offset by significant leakage in high-floor/large-unit inventory).

  • Appreciation Score: 25 (Critical weakness. Long-term holds consistently show flat or negative nominal returns over 10-15 year periods).


7. COMPOSITE SCORE & CLASSIFICATION

  • Composite Score: 45.75

  • Category: Yield-Oriented (At Risk)

  • Justification: The building generates cash flow (Yield), but the combination of capital stagnation (Score 25) and high friction (Liquidity 50) places it in the "At Risk" category.


8. TRANSACTION EXAMPLES

Resale Depreciation / Stagnation

  1. Unit 20E (2BR):

    • Bought: $3,079,000 ($1,700 PPSF) in May 2015.

    • Sold: $2,250,000 ($1,416 PPSF) in May 2024.

    • Result: -26.9% Loss over 9 years.

    • Driver: Market regime timing (Bought at 2015 peak).

  2. Unit 5A (3BR):

    • Bought: $3,250,000 ($1,674 PPSF) in Jun 2015.

    • Sold: $2,750,000 ($1,391 PPSF) in May 2021.

    • Result: -15.3% Loss over 6 years.

    • Driver: Liquidity shift (DOM change).

  3. Unit 43B (3BR):

    • Bought: ~$3,869,350 ($1,364 PPSF) in Mar 2006.

    • Sold: $3,850,000 ($1,358 PPSF) in Jan 2022.

    • Result: Flat (0%) over 16 years.

    • Driver: Sponsor price normalization (Initial sponsor premium never compounded).

  4. Unit 6A (3BR):

    • Bought: $2,900,000 estimated (based on similar Unit 10A in 2007).

    • Sold: $2,520,000 ($1,273 PPSF) in Oct 2022.

    • Result: Negative/Flat over 15 years.

    • Driver: Unit size / unit mix imbalance.

Resale Appreciation (Modest)

  1. Unit 37C (2BR):

    • Bought: $2,700,000 ($1,293 PPSF) in May 2011.

    • Sold: $3,250,000 ($1,557 PPSF) in Feb 2024.

    • Result: +20.3% over 13 years (CAGR: ~1.4%).

    • Driver: Market regime timing.

  2. Unit 60A (2BR):

    • Bought: $3,275,000 ($1,624 PPSF) in Oct 2007.

    • Sold: $4,000,000 ($1,984 PPSF) in Feb 2019.

    • Result: +22% over 11 years (CAGR: ~1.8%).

    • Driver: Line-level premium persistence.

  3. Unit 60C (2BR):

    • Bought: $3,320,000 ($1,590 PPSF) in Oct 2009.

    • Sold: $3,250,000 ($1,557 PPSF) in Oct 2023.

    • Result: -2.1% (Loss). (Included here to show even "winners" struggle).

    • Driver: Market regime timing.

  4. Unit 9H (2BR):

    • Bought: $1,300,000 ($974 PPSF) in Sep 2010.

    • Sold: $1,675,000 ($1,255 PPSF) in Dec 2024.

    • Result: +28.8% over 14 years (CAGR: ~1.8%).

    • Driver: Market regime timing.


9. RISKS & RED FLAGS

  • Capital Destruction: The building has consistently failed to preserve inflation-adjusted capital since 2006. Long-term owners (10+ years) frequently exit at flat nominal prices or losses (e.g., Unit 43B, Unit 5A).

  • Liquidity Trap: Larger units (2BR/3BR) have a median DOM of 110–145 days, with severe outliers (e.g., Unit 32D at 742 days). This signals difficulty in exiting positions.

  • Red Flag: Do not buy mid-floor 3BRs (Line A or B) expecting growth. History shows these units mean-revert to ~$1,350–$1,400 PPSF regardless of the broader market cycle.


10. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Trump World Tower is a Yield-Oriented (At Risk) asset that currently functions as a stagnant store of value rather than a growth vehicle. While the building commands consistent rental demand, capital appreciation has been virtually non-existent for nearly two decades, with key lines (like 3BRs) trading in 2022–2025 at prices identical to their 2006 sponsor levels. This represents a massive real-value loss against the NYXRCSA benchmark. Income capture is viable in smaller units, but larger inventory suffers from significant income leakage due to absorption times often exceeding 6 months. Opportunity exists only for yield-focused buyers entering at a distressed basis ($1,200 PPSF).


B³ SCORECARD

  • Liquidity Score: 50

  • Rent Capture Score: 65

  • Appreciation Score: 25

  • Composite Score: 45.75

  • Category: Yield-Oriented (At Risk)

  • Unit Mix: 2BR/3BR Dominant (~75% sales activity)

Disclosures: Approximately 65 transactions from 2002–2006 (DOM ≤ 30 days or "No Listing") were reclassified as Sponsor-Driven to prevent artificial inflation of early-cycle appreciation baselines [4, 75–96].

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