Trump International Hotel and Tower (1 Central Park West)
1. BUILDING OVERVIEW (ANALYST FRAMING)
Trump International Hotel and Tower (1 Central Park West) is a mature resale condo completed in 1960 and converted/renovated in the late 1990s. Consisting of 156 units across 44 floors, the building is a high-scale asset in the Lincoln Square sub-market. Based on post-sponsor behavior, the building is classified as Hybrid (At Risk). While it significantly outperforms Lincoln Square by 50.7% in absolute pricing, its capital compounding is inconsistent, and it suffers from significant "income leakage" due to high rental absorption friction (median DOM).
2. UNIT MIX & COMPOSITION
Based on 225 recorded sales and 87 rental transactions, the building’s inventory and activity are distributed as follows:
2BR: ~38% of sales activity (Median PPSF: $2,071–$2,382). Dominant liquidity provider.
3BR+: ~35% of sales activity (Median PPSF: $3,026–$4,641). High-tier concentration.
1BR: ~15% of activity (Median PPSF: $1,104–$2,828).
Studios: ~4.5% of activity (Median PPSF: $1,264).
Analysis: The building's high concentration of 2BR and 3BR+ units (combined ~73% of activity) creates a profile of high-value trades but subjects the asset to liquidity shifts, as these larger footprints face longer absorption periods in the secondary market.
3. LINE (STACK) PERFORMANCE — RESALE ONLY
Liquidity (Fastest Lines): Line B (2BR/2BA) exhibits the highest relative liquidity with a median DOM of 42 days.
Price Strength: Line A (3BR stacks) and Line C (4BR/5BR stacks) command structural premiums, with median PPSF reaching $4,122–$5,701.
Appreciation: Compounding is highly volatile at the line level. Line D (3BR) traded at $2,838 PPSF in 2009 and $3,037 PPSF in 2026, a CAGR of ~0.4%. This significantly trails the NYXRCSA index, which moved from approximately 160 to 331.1 in the same period.
4. BUILDING-WIDE PPSF TREND (NORMALIZED)
2003–2008: Early resale/conversion period; median PPSF established between $1,500 and $3,000.
2012–2019: Flat/Cyclical; pricing for high-tier units (Lines A, C) peaked but failed to establish a new building-wide floor.
2020–2025: Drawdown/Stagnation; recent trades like Unit 46D ($2,364 PPSF in 2025 vs. $3,546 in 2014) indicate a mean-reverting trend toward 2007-2010 levels.
Conclusion: Flat/Cyclical.
5. RENT CAPTURE ANALYSIS
Mandatory Metric: Effective Annual Rent
Unit 39C (2BR, 2025): Achieved $16,500. DOM: 139. Effective Rent: $10,216.
Unit 25C (2BR, 2025): Achieved $18,000. DOM: 141. Effective Rent: $11,046.
Unit 30B (2BR, 2024): Achieved $16,000. DOM: 211. Effective Rent: $6,750.
Unit 25G (2BR, 2025): Achieved $20,000. DOM: 20. Effective Rent: $18,904.
Analysis: The building suffers from extreme income leakage. While nominal rents are high (~$100–$140/SF), units with high absorption times (DOM > 100) lose 35% to 58% of their annual income to vacancy.
6. B³ SCORING SYSTEM (0–100)
Liquidity Score: 50 (Friction is high; building median DOM of 146 days is significantly above Manhattan averages).
Rent Capture Score: 45 (High nominal rents are consistently offset by massive leakage from prolonged vacancy).
Appreciation Score: 40 (Pricing is flat in real terms relative to the NYXRCSA benchmark over 15 years).
7. COMPOSITE SCORE & CLASSIFICATION
Composite Score: 45.0
Category: Hybrid (At Risk)
Justification: The building maintains high absolute value (Pillar 2) but lacks the liquidity (Pillar 1) and compounding (Pillar 3) required for Core or Appreciation-Driven status.
8. TRANSACTION EXAMPLES
Resale Appreciation (Nominal)
Unit 26A (3BR): $6,300,000 ($3,145 PPSF) in 2006 → $8,300,000 ($4,143 PPSF) in 2024. +31.7% (+1.5% CAGR). Driver: Line-level premium persistence.
Unit 31F (2BR): $1,350,000 ($1,045 PPSF) in 2003 → $3,125,000 ($2,420 PPSF) in 2017. +131% (+6.2% CAGR). Driver: Market regime timing.
Unit 24D (3BR): $6,400,000 ($2,838 PPSF) in 2009 → $6,850,000 ($3,037 PPSF) in 2026. +7.0% (+0.4% CAGR). Driver: Sponsor price normalization.
Unit 36A (3BR): $6,500,000 ($3,104 PPSF) in 2006 → $9,250,000 ($4,417 PPSF) in 2022. +42% (+2.2% CAGR). Driver: Line-level premium persistence.
Resale Depreciation/Stagnation
Unit 23D (3BR): $8,550,000 ($3,791 PPSF) in 2014 → $6,950,000 ($3,082 PPSF) in 2024. -18.7%. Driver: Liquidity shift (DOM change).
Unit 40D (3BR): $7,550,000 ($3,490 PPSF) in 2008 → $4,995,000 ($2,307 PPSF) in 2020. -33.8%. Driver: Market regime timing.
Unit 46D (3BR): $7,500,000 ($3,546 PPSF) in 2014 → $5,000,000 ($2,364 PPSF) in 2025. -33.3%. Driver: Unit size / unit mix imbalance.
Unit 33F (2BR): $2,290,125 ($1,773 PPSF) in 2021 → No resale. Highlights Yield-Oriented volatility.
9. RISKS & RED FLAGS
Chronic Rental Leakage: Rental DOM frequently exceeds 130 days, destroying the net yield of high-carry 2BR and 3BR units.
Mean-Reversion Risk: Several high-floor D-line units are reselling at 20-30% discounts to their 2014 peaks.
Red Flag: Avoid the 3BR/4BA stacks (Line D) as capital growth vehicles; they show the highest price erosion and most significant liquidity shifts.
10. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Trump International is a high-prestige, Hybrid (At Risk) asset that acts as an absolute price leader in Lincoln Square but fails as a capital growth vehicle. Post-sponsor behavior is defined by flat-to-negative compounding in major stacks and significant income leakage, where nearly 40% of potential rental income is lost to absorption friction (DOM). Opportunity is restricted to high-liquidity 2BR lines (Line B), while the larger 3BR+ units are trapped in a mean-reverting cycle where 2025 trades are failing to maintain mid-decade peaks.
B³ SCORECARD
Liquidity Score: 50
Rent Capture Score: 45
Appreciation Score: 40
Composite Score: 45.0
Category: Hybrid (At Risk)
Unit Mix: 2BR/3BR+ Dominant (~73%)
Disclosures: Three transactions (Units 512, 712, 916) were reclassified as Sponsor-Driven per the 30-day DOM/5-year rule. This normalization revealed that early-cycle "resale" DOM was artificially low, masking the subsequent 146-day friction median.