The Plaza Residences (1 Central Park South)

1. BUILDING OVERVIEW (ANALYST FRAMING)

The Plaza Residences (1 Central Park South) is a mature resale condo originally built in 1907 and converted in 2007. With 182 units across 21 floors, it represents a high-scale asset in the Midtown Center sub-market. Based on post-sponsor behavior, the building is classified as a Hybrid asset. While it commands a significant absolute price premium—outperforming Midtown Center by 31.3%—its post-sponsor compounding is inconsistent, characterized by high line-level dispersion and significant "income leakage" in the rental market due to prolonged absorption times.

2. UNIT MIX & COMPOSITION

Based on 322 recorded sales, the inventory is distributed as follows:

• 1BR: 111 sales (~34.5% of activity). Median PPSF: $2,878–$3,063.

• 2BR: 96 sales (~29.8% of activity). Median PPSF: $2,982–$3,887.

• 3BR+: 91 sales (~28.3% of activity). Median PPSF: $3,650–$5,259.

• Studios: 14 sales (~4.3% of activity). Median PPSF: $2,177.

Analysis: The building's liquidity is anchored by 1BR and 2BR units, which comprise over 64% of transaction volume. The high concentration of larger 3BR+ units contributes to the building's high median sales price ($5.7M) but also drives the high median Days on Market (191 days).

3. LINE (STACK) PERFORMANCE — RESALE ONLY

• Liquidity (Fastest Lines): Line 04 and Line 02 (Studios/1BRs) demonstrate the highest relative liquidity, though the building-wide median DOM remains high at 191 days.

• Price Strength: Line 09 and Line 11 (typically 3BR+ configurations) command the highest premiums, with median PPSF reaching $5,259.

• Appreciation: Compounding is highly volatile. For example, Line 08 (1BR) showed a PPSF of $2,882 in 2007 but has traded as low as $1,726 in 2024 and $2,621 in 2025, indicating a negative or flat CAGR over nearly two decades. This severely underperforms the NYXRCSA index, which grew to 331.1 by Oct 2025.

4. BUILDING-WIDE PPSF TREND (NORMALIZED)

• 2007–2010: Sponsor-Driven Period. Initial pricing was established at a high baseline (e.g., Unit 1207 at $6,625 PPSF).

• 2011–2019: Flat/Cyclical. Resale PPSF struggled to maintain sponsor levels, with many units trading at discounts (Median discount of 15.36%).

• 2020–2025: Mean-Reverting. Recent sales (Unit 508 at $2,621 PPSF in 2025 vs $2,882 in 2007) show the building is failing to capture broader market growth.

Conclusion: Flat/Cyclical.

5. RENT CAPTURE ANALYSIS

Mandatory Metric: Effective Annual Rent

• Unit 1609 (3BR, 2025): Achieved $34,000. DOM: 73. Effective Rent: $27,200.

• Unit 702 (1BR, 2024): Achieved $9,000. DOM: 59. Effective Rent: $7,545.

• Unit 1801 (4BR, 2023): Achieved $38,000. DOM: 372. Effective Rent: $0 (Vacancy exceeded one year).

Analysis: The building suffers from massive income leakage, particularly in 3BR+ units where DOM frequently exceeds 150 days. This friction reduces nominal yields significantly.

6. B³ SCORING SYSTEM (0–100)

• Liquidity Score: 40 (High friction; 191-day median DOM is nearly double the Manhattan average).

• Rent Capture Score: 55 (Strong nominal rents are offset by chronic vacancy leakage in larger stacks).

• Appreciation Score: 45 (Weak line-level compounding; most resales are trading near or below 2007 sponsor levels).

7. COMPOSITE SCORE & CLASSIFICATION

• Composite Score: 46.25

• Category: Hybrid (At Risk)

• Justification: The building maintains high absolute price levels but lacks the liquidity (DOM < 100) and appreciation (CAGR > 3%) required for "Core" or "Appreciation-Driven" status.

8. TRANSACTION EXAMPLES

Resale Appreciation (Nominal)

1. Unit 1301 (3BR): $9,696,395 (2007) → $10,750,000 (2021). CAGR: 0.7%. Driver: Line-level premium persistence.

2. Unit 503 (2BR): $8,952,425 (2007) → $10,150,000 (2017). CAGR: 1.3%. Driver: Market regime timing.

Resale Depreciation/Stagnation

1. Unit 508 (1BR): $2,254,281 (2007) → $2,050,000 (2025). Change: -9.1%. Driver: Sponsor price normalization.

2. Unit 1413 (2BR): $8,995,000 (2008) → $5,300,000 (2024). Change: -41%. Driver: Liquidity shift / Unit mix imbalance.

3. Unit 1710 (1BR): $2,715,910 (2008) → $1,550,000 (2024). Change: -42.9%. Driver: Sponsor price normalization.

4. Unit 1208 (1BR): $2,603,316 (2008) → $1,350,000 (2024). Change: -48%. Driver: Market regime timing.

9. RISKS & RED FLAGS

• Chronic Rental Vacancy: Units like 1801 (372 DOM) and PH11 (161 DOM) demonstrate that high-carry units can sit vacant for over a year, destroying annual yield.

• Negative Compounding: Several units (1710, 1208, 1413) are trading at 30-50% discounts to their 2007-2008 purchase prices.

• Red Flag: Avoid the 1BR stacks (Lines 08, 10) as investment vehicles; they show the most significant price erosion from sponsor levels.

10. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Plaza Residences is a Hybrid asset that functions more as a store of absolute value than a vehicle for capital growth. While it significantly outperforms its sub-market in absolute PPSF, its post-sponsor behavior is marked by zero-to-negative compounding and extreme income leakage. Rent capture is inconsistent, with larger units frequently remaining vacant for over six months. Opportunity is restricted to specific line-level premiums in the 2BR/3BR stacks, while the 1BR units have faced massive sponsor price normalization and loss of value over time.

B³ SCORECARD

• Liquidity Score: 40

• Rent Capture Score: 55

• Appreciation Score: 45

• Composite Score: 46.25

• Category: Hybrid (At Risk)

• Unit Mix: 1BR (34.5%) / 2BR (29.8%) Dominant

Disclosures: Approximately 180 transactions from 2007–2010 (marked by "No Listing" or 0 DOM) were reclassified as Sponsor-Driven. This normalization reveals that current resale PPSF is significantly lower than initial conversion pricing in several key lines.